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A method for obtaining a memory snapshot of a computer while in operation is disclosed. This method
involves using a System Management Interrupt (SMI) to read memory and write it out to a designated
output for further analysis.
The ability to look at system memory when analyzing a PC system for malware or bugs is invaluable.
Traditionally, memory snapshots have been obtained using software in the OS or specialized hardware.
Software cannot capture a true snapshot because the OS is still running and modifying memory.
Specialized hardware can halt the OS, but can be expensive, hard to find, and hard to use. Both capture
methods can be detected by malware running on the system. If the snapshot is detected by malware,
the malware could manipulate the data being captured to hide itself, modify pieces of itself to make
reverse engineering difficult, spread common malware fingerprints throughout memory to increase the
difficulty of memory forensics, or several other anti‐memory forensics techniques.
With SMM, system management mode, it is possible to halt the OS and obtain a snapshot of all memory
and registers while remaining transparent to the OS. First, an SMI handler, which will ultimately take the
snapshot, is registered in the firmware. Next a user initiates the snapshot, at any time, by triggering the
SMI. This freezes the OS and transitions the processor into SMM. While in SMM, the processor can read
all system memory and registers. It will then write those values to a target area (such as a reserved area
of system flash or a file) and return control to the OS. The snapshot can be further configured on a timer
or other pattern allowing a user to obtain snapshots over time for dynamic analysis.
An example of such a system is comprised of an embedded controller, a keyboard connected to the
embedded controller, and firmware that runs in system management mode. The user can trigger a
snapshot of system memory at any time by pressing a preconfigured key on the keyboard. The EC will
see the keypress and generate a hardware SMI. The SMM code will perform the snapshot and output it
to a file on the hard drive. Afterwards, execution will return to the OS, and the user can analyze the
memory snapshot.
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